Previous studies quantifying the effects of increased capital taxation during the U.S. Great Depression find that its contribution is small, both in accounting for the downturn in the early 1930s and in accounting for the slow recovery after 1934. This paper confirms that the effects are small in the case of taxation of business profits, but finds large effects in the case of taxation of dividend income. Tax rates on dividends rose dramatically during the 1930s and, when fed into a general equilibrium model, imply significant declines in investment and equity values and nontrivial declines in gross domestic product (GDP) and hours of work. The results are amplified if businesses make intangible investments which can be expensed from taxable capital income.
Introduction
Although there is little consensus about the main contributors to the large contraction of the first half of the 1930s and the slow subsequent recovery, there is some consensus that fiscal policy played only a minor role in the U.S. Great Depression. Empirically, it is argued that government spending relative to GDP did not rise sufficiently and that taxes were filed by very few households (and paid by even fewer). (See, for example, Romer (1992) .) Theoretically, it is argued that predictions of neoclassical theory for the impact of increased taxation and spending are too small to matter. (See, in particular, Cole and Ohanian (1999) .)
In this paper, I challenge the view that the impact of all fiscal policies was small. Cole and Ohanian (1999) find that the impact of capital taxation is small because they assume that the only capital income taxed is profits. The key policy change, however, was not the taxation of profits but the taxation of dividends. Using the same standard growth model as Cole and Ohanian, I show that higher effective tax rates on dividends, consistent with the pattern of U.S. rates in the 1930s, lead to dramatic declines in investment and equity values.
Large changes in tax policy were not enacted until 1932 with the Revenue Act of 1932.
However, as early as February 1930, Hoover projected large tax increases if Congressmen enacted their proposed spending projects. Theoretically, anticipated tax increases on future distributions lead to increases in current distributions and therefore declines in business investment. Furthermore, although few households paid income taxes, taxpayers that did earned almost all of the income distributed by corporations and unincorporated businesses.
If I extend the model to include both tangible and intangible capital, the effects are amplified. Intangible investments in research and development, brands, and organization capital are expenses of businesses and subtracted from their taxable income. When I extend the standard growth model to include both tangible and intangible investments, I find a large reallocation from tangible investment to intangible investment in the first half of the 1930s. With intangible capital excluded, theory predicts that consumption rises as investment declines; however, such a rise in consumption did not occur in the Great Depression. With intangible capital included, theory predicts a decline in consumption when dividends are taxed. One numerical issue that arises in computing equilibria in the model with intangible capital is strongly binding constraints ensuring the nonnegativity of tangible investment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I reconsider the predictions of the neoclassical growth model analyzed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) , including as they do only taxation of profits and labor income. With the same model, I then allow for taxes on profits, labor income, dividends, undistributed profits, property, and consumption. I show that the results change dramatically, primarily due to the increased taxation of dividends.
In Section 3, I extend the model to include intangible and tangible investment and rerun the numerical experiments. Section 4 concludes.
Model without Intangible Investment
In the standard one-sector growth model, given initial capital stock k 0 , the problem for the stand-in household is to choose consumption c, investment x, and hours h to maximize
subject to the constraints
where variables are written in per capita terms and N t = N 0 (1 + η) t is the population in t. Capital is paid rent r t , labor is paid wage w t , and per capita transfers are given by κ t . Taxes are summarized by the variable ζ t in (2.2). Below, I will specify two different formulas for ζ t .
The aggregate production function is given by
where capital letters denote aggregates. The parameter Z t is labor-augmenting technical change that is assumed to grow at a constant rate, Z t = (1+γ) t . The firm rents capital and labor. If profits are maximized, then the rental rates are equal to the marginal products.
The goods market clears so N t (c t + x t + g t ) = Y t and g t = ζ t , where g t is per capita government spending.
Standard Analysis of Capital Taxation
A standard practice in the business cycle literature is to assume that taxes are levied on capital and labor with excess revenues rebated to households. Capital taxes are modeled as taxes on profits and thus,
where τ pt is the tax rate on capital income (i.e., profits), and τ ht is the tax rate on labor income.
In their analysis of the U.S. Great Depression, Cole and Ohanian (1999) conclude that plausible estimates of the increase in the tax rates τ pt and τ ht are not large enough to have much of an effect. They use estimates of Joines (1981) For my simulation, I use a flow utility function given by
and parameters that imply aggregate quantities consistent with the U.S. data in 1929, namely ψ = 2, δ = 0.05, β = 0.98, γ = .02, η = .01, and θ = .33.
In Figures 2-4 
Analysis of Capital Taxation Motivated by U.S. Policy
Next, I modify the way taxes are modeled and rerun the numerical experiment. Specifically, I include three additional taxes on capital income-dividends, property, and undistributed profits-as well as taxes on consumption. In this case, the specific formula for ζ t is given
where τ kt is the tax rate on property, τ pt is the tax rate on profits, τ dt is the tax rate on dividends, τ ut is the tax rate on undistributed profits, τ ct is the tax rate on consumption, and τ ht is the tax rate on labor income. Note that taxable income for the tax on profits is net of depreciation and property tax, and taxable income for the tax on distributions is net of taxes on profits, property, and undistributed profits.
In Appendix A, I describe how I construct estimates of the tax rates based on U.S. data. Here, I use these rates as inputs in the numerical experiments. Table A.1 shows the time series that are input for τ pt , τ dt , τ kt , and τ ct . For the labor income, I
use Joines ( estimate for marginal tax rates. Both simulations assume that households have perfect foresight about future tax rates and government spending. (Later I relax that assumption.) Figure 7 shows that disaggregating the capital tax rates makes a big difference for the model predictions. With the Joines' tax rate on profits only, investment declines very gradually. With different rates on profits, dividends, and property, the model predicts an immediate and sharp fall in investment. The primary determinant for the fall is expectations about the future changes in the tax rate on dividends. In fact, with τ pt and τ kt set equal and fixed to 1929 levels, the picture changes little; the initial drop is 68 percent instead of 75 percent but the pattern is the same. The reason for the large decline is that households anticipate large changes in the effective return to capital.
To see this, consider the intertemporal first-order condition for the household's maximization problem:
whereβ = β/(1 + γ) and variables with hats are detrended by population and growth in technology, (1 + γ) t . If tax rates on dividends are constant, then the terms 1 − τ dt and 1 − τ dt+1 cancel. In this case, taxes on dividends have no effect if revenues are lumpsum rebated to households because their budget sets do not change and their first-order conditions do not change. Similarly, if households have myopic expectations-by which I mean that every period they think the current tax rates they are facing will be in place forever-then tax rates on dividends have no effect even if they do change in reality. On the other hand, if households put some probability on changing rates, then the terms 1−τ dt and 1 − τ dt+1 do not cancel and the effective rate of return to capital is affected. With tax rates rising, effective rates of return are falling.
Another important consequence of the increase in tax rates on dividends is the decline in equity values. In Figure 10 , I show the time series for the (detrended) real equity value, which in this case is equal to
where K t+1 is aggregate end-of-year capital. Notice that the price of capital is one minus the tax rate on dividends. A rise in the tax rate from 10 percent to 30 percent implies a 22 percent decline in the price of capital. If the tax proceeds are rebated to households, then the government becomes a shareholder owning 22 percent of the business and the capital stock is not permanently changed. For shareholders facing the highest surtax rate (75 percent), the impact on their equity values would be large.
In Another sensitivity check that I did was to include the undistributed profits tax in 1936 and 1937. I tried different rates in the statutory range of 7 percent to 27 percent.
With the rates at 7 percent, investment is below trend about 10 percent in 1936 and 20 percent in 1937. With rates at 27 percent, investment in these two years is close to zero.
This wide range of estimates necessitates further investigation of the effective rates on undistributed profits.
Model with Intangible Investment
I now extend the basic growth model to include intangible investment. The household problem remains the same as in Section 2 except for an additional investment choice. I examine the extended model's predictions for the time series in the 1930s and show that changes in tax rates imply large shifts from accumulating tangible capital to intangible capital.
Theory
The aggregate production technology is characterized by the two aggregate production relations:
Firms produce final output y using their intangible capital k I , tangible capital k Given (k T 0 , k I0 ), the stand-in household maximizes
As before, all variables are in per capita units and there is growth in population at rate η. The relative price of intangible investment and consumption is q. The rental rates for tangible and intangible capital are denoted by r T and r I , respectively, and the wage rate for labor is denoted by w. As before, inputs are paid their marginal products.
The tax system in this model is the same as that used earlier but the treatment of tangible and intangible income differs. Taxes on property and undistributed profits are levied on tangible capital and tangible net investment. For the purposes of taxation of profits, tangible capital is not expensed but intangible capital is. The asymmetric treatment also affects the incidence of the tax on dividends.
Gross domestic product in the economy is the sum of private consumption, tangible investment, and public consumption; in per capita terms GDP is c+x T +g. Gross domestic income (GDI) is the sum of labor income wh and capital income less expensed investment,
Predictions
Next, I compute the equilibrium for the model with intangible capital and compare predictions of the model with U.S. data.
As before, I assume that the utility function is logarithmic with ψ = 2, β = .98, γ = .02, and η = .01. The tangible depreciation rate is the same as before with δ T = .05.
The share on tangible capital in (3.1) and (3.2) is set equal to 0.25 and the share on intangible is set equal to 0.07. The intangible depreciation rate is set equal to 0. These parameters for intangible shares and depreciation imply that the intangible stock is about 3/4 as large as the tangible stock, which is consistent with McGrattan and Prescott (2004) .
If I use the same tax rate series as in Section 2, a problem arises with the computation of equilibrium. The problem is that the effect of the higher dividend taxes is so large that the household's nonnegativity constraints strongly bind and, without a good guess of the full solution for decision functions, I am unable to find a solution. This does not mean one does not exist but if it does, it is hard to compute. Thus, to simplify the computation, I
solved an easier case without the full change in the tax rates on profits or dividends and all other tax rates set equal to constants.
In Figure 5 , I display the time-varying rates for profits and dividends. Notice that the dividend tax rate is constant after 1933 at a rate that is lower than the actual rate faced by U.S. dividend earners. The profit tax is a simple step function. It turns out that even with these simpler and lower tax rate series, tangible investment declines to zero and nonnegativity constraints bind. This is shown in Figure 16 . Figure 16 plots In Figure 17 , I plot the model prediction for detrended real GDP along with U.S. detrended real GDP. I find that a large fraction of the observed declines are accounted for in the period 1929-1933. U.S. GDP falls to 65 percent while model GDP falls to 78 percent.
In Figure 18 , I plot the model prediction for production hours per capita (h 1 ) and U.S. hours per capita. As in the case of GDP, the model can account for much of the decline in hours. U.S. hours per capita fall to 73 percent while model hours per capita fall to 80 percent.
What these and earlier findings show is that, despite conventional wisdom, taxation of capital is a potentially important contributor to the U.S. contraction and, depending on how effective the undistributed profits tax was, may also have had a large impact on the recovery.
Conclusion
Many theories have been proposed for the large contraction of the 1930s and the slow recovery. Absent in the theories of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Cole and Ohanian (2004) and many others is any role for fiscal policy. This paper challenges the coventional view that fiscal policy played little or no role. Tax rates on dividends rose significantly during the decade and, when fed into the standard growth model, imply a large drop in investment and equity values. If I include intangible investment as well as tangible investment in the model, the effects are even larger since households can shift investment to nontaxable activities and simultaneously achieve dividend and consumption smoothing.
Further work is needed before a definitive answer can be given to the question, What was the impact of capital taxation in the U.S. Great Depression? The analysis done in this paper relies on a stand-in household. Tax data from the 1930s show that a more reasonable assumption is that taxpayers were a small group in the population that held almost all of the capital income derived from business activity. Also, more work is needed in modeling taxation of undistributed profits and capital gains.
Appendix A.
The main source for the data used in this study is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which publishes the national accounts and fixed asset tables in the Survey of Current Business (available online at www.bea.gov). In this appendix I provide details on the data used and the necessary adjustments that are made to make the model accounts consistent with the U.S. accounts.
A.1. National Accounts and Fixed Assets
The main components of GDP are found in ). All components of GDP are deflated by the GDP deflator (in Table 1 . 1.9) and population at midperiod (Table 2 .1).
A.1.1. Components of GDP
Consumption is defined to be personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and services adjusted to include consumer durable services and leave out sales tax. (Details of these adjustments are described below.) Investment is defined to be gross private domestic investment plus net exports and personal consumption expenditures on durables after subtracting sales taxes. Government spending is defined to be government consumption expenditures and gross investment.
A.1.2. Adjustments to Accounts
Two adjustments are made to GDP and its components to make them consistent with the model accounts: sales taxes are subtracted and services for consumer durables and government capital are added.
Sales Taxes. Unlike the NIPA, the model output does not include consumption taxes as part of consumption and as part of value added. I therefore subtract sales and excise taxes from the NIPA data on taxes on production and imports and from personal consumption expenditures since these taxes primarily affect consumption expenditures.
Fixed Asset Expenditures. I treat expenditures on all fixed assets as investment.
Thus, spending on consumer durables is treated as an investment rather than as a consumption expenditure and moved from the consumption category to the investment category. The consumer durables services sector is introduced in the same way as the NIPA introduces owner-occupied housing services. Households rent the consumer durables to themselves. Specifically, I add depreciation of consumer durables to consumption of fixed capital of households and to private consumption I add imputed additional capital services for consumer durables to capital income and to private consumption. I assume a rate of return equal to 4.1 percent, which is an estimate of the return on other types of capital. A related adjustment is made for government capital. Specifically, I add imputed additional capital services for government capital to capital income and to public consumption.
A.2. Tax Rates
In the first series of numerical exercises (Figures 2-4 ), I use estimates of marginal tax rates on capital and labor from Joines (1981) , specifically MTRK1 and MTRL1 (shown in Figure 1 ).
In the second series of numerical exercises (Figures 7-9 ), I use the Joines (1981) MTRL1 for the tax on labor income but I do not use MTRK1 for capital income. Instead, I include different rates for profits, dividends, and property. These rates are reported in Table A .1 The profits tax is the statutory rate reported in the IRS's Statistics of Income, smoothed so that it is not simply a step function. The source of the dividend tax is McGrattan and Prescott (2003) who compute an average weighted marginal tax rate. In other words, a tax rate on dividend income is computed using data for each income group from the IRS Statistics of Income. An weighted average is computed using the fraction of dividend income per income group as the weighting factor. The time series for the period 1913-2000 is shown in Figure 5 . In Figure 6 , I show the rate for 1929-1939 along with the smoothed rate I use in computer simulations and the tax rate for the highest dividend income bracket.
In the last two columns of 
A.3. Hours Per Capita
The primary source of the hours series is Kendrick (1961) , Table A Capital, 1929 Capital, -1939 
